

# The Future of Families and Future Prospects for Gender Equality and Family Policy<sup>1</sup>

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## I. Introduction

Along with rapid demographic changes such as a low birth rate and an ageing population, family structure and awareness are also undergoing a fast transformation. Such changes have led to an increase in using paid or public service for care, which used to exist on a reciprocal basis between family members. Yet at the same time there are still groups of society who are over-dependant and place too much value on family. Such excessiveness in family-oriented ideology has resulted in an overall grey area with regard to family function support services.

Korean society's process of compressive fluctuation of the family has affected an increase in segmentation and complexity between generations. Such an imbalance thus leads to a weakening of the foundation of social consensus towards the concept and function of the family, and an objective prejudgment of the present changes and future direction of change is ever the most important and necessary in policy planning.


On this note, the Korean Women's Development Institute. has forecasted the future 20 years of the Korean family, predicting medium to long term changes in family structure and ways of living, and based on this has contemplated the new gender equality and family policies, and the categories of main family support policy and policy planning. 2011 was the first year of

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1 This paper is a summary of the Future of the Family and Prospects for Policies on Women and Family (I) published by the Korea Women's Development Institute (2011). Researchers include Hye-gyeong Chang, Eun-ji Kim, Young-lan Kim, Hye-yeong Kim, and Jae-hoon Jeong. The research includes sub-topics as follows: Changes in familial environment as viewed through future environment scanning by Yong-seok Seo et al. (2011); Issues in domestic and international family policies and changes in family environment by Hong-sik Yoon et al. (2011); and Changes in family environment brought about by demographic changes by Myoung-jin Lee and Seul-gi Choi (2011).

four consecutive years of research, and with an analysis of an environment surrounded by family changes and discovery of predictive factors for the future, serves as the basis of the research.

The research aims and direction for the year 2011 are as follows. Firstly, an objective forecast of future family environments. In order to do this, domestic research on future trends and direction of family changes among OECD member nations will be examined, and a forecast of Korea's family changes will be made through various methodologies. Secondly, a subjective forecast will be made on the future family. Citizens' perception of the future and degrees of acceptance of a diverse range of family structures will be looked at, and an analysis will be made on acceptance towards changes in family structure in a subjective environmental setting. Thirdly, based on such objective and subjective forecasts of the family structure, corresponding gender equality and family policy directions will be proposed.



Areas and Flow of Research, Year 2011

This research was carried out by using the following methods. Firstly, a study of family changes among OECD member nations was carried out through an analysis of related literature and statistical data. Secondly, for Korea's future family forecast environmental scanning was used, for estimated future population the Cohort Component Method, survey on professionals and scenario techniques. Thirdly, a survey on Korean citizens' perceptions of the future family was carried out. The survey was conducted on a target group aged over 20 and under 70 years of age. Samples from 1500 people were extracted using a multi-phase stratified sampling method. Fourth, during the whole process of research consultation meetings and specialist workshops were held, tasks outsourced and regular meetings relating to tasks were held.

## II. Family-related Indicators in OECD Countries?

### 1. Trends in Family-related indicators

Family-related indicators in OECD countries are as follows. Firstly, the majority of the countries show a decrease in fertility rate. However, with the exception of Korean and Germany which show consistently low rates, other nations show a rebound after a drop. Denmark, Norway and Sweden showed the first rebound in the 1980s and although all experienced fluctuations to an extent, had fertility rates nearing 2.10, which is close to the standard of replacement rates. France showed an upward turn in fertility rates from 1990 onwards, while Italy, Japan, Greece, Spain and England showed such changes after 2000. Spain and Greece, which, like Korea, are strong in familism values and weak welfare states with similar economic standards, are highly likely to have experienced a rebound in fertility rates after proactive intervention by the government. Since the year 2000, most countries which had experienced a rebound in fertility rates have expanded budgets to support families.

Secondly, except Sweden and the US, which already had high levels, other nations experienced a continuous increase in employment rates for women. Spain, Germany and Austria, which have strong familism values and gender division in employment, also saw a growth in female employment. However, while Spain has shown a 11.7%p increase and Austria and Germany 7.5%p over the last 10 years, the growth for Korea is a mere 3.2%p.

Thirdly, couple families occupied a higher ratio in Greece, Spain, Italy and such Southern European countries, while on the other hand Northern European countries had comparatively less single-person households. It can be said that the unmarried, divorced and those marrying late are related to the proportion of single-person households.

Fourth, with relation to marriage, the crude marriage rate shows an average OECD decrease of -38.5%, and with a rate of -22.5%, Korea comes after Sweden and Denmark at third lowest ranking. Due to the fact cohabiting is not accepted as a substitute for marriage in Korea, it cannot be said that a stable rate of marriage is occurring.

Fifth, the proportion of cohabiting couples accounts for an average of 6.8% among 25 OECD member countries, of which those in the age group of 20-34 account for twice the amount of the population at 12.4%. Such changes show that cohabiting is now increasingly considered an alternative to marriage.

Lastly, although these cannot be said to directly affect changes in the family, an increase in diverse ethnicities and races is something which should be given attention to. Except from Germany and Sweden, the foreign population is rapidly growing. An increase in foreign population is likely to lead to an increase in international marriages. Korea has seen a three-fold increase in international marriages over a span of 10 years, from 3.5% in 2000 to 10.5% in 2010.

When such data is combined, a decrease in institutional marriage and increase in single-per-

son households in main OECD countries can be seen. Woman's participation in labor market is continuously increasing, leading to an acceleration of the creation of a balance in gender roles. Such changes suggest that changes need to be made to policies which have been oriented towards the previous male-provider household.

## 2. A Focus on Germany and the UK

An in-depth study of England and Germany, representative conservative welfare states and liberal welfare states among OECD countries, was carried out. It is anticipated that the study of these two countries will show the varied spectrum which Korean society is to experience. The population estimation for Germany forecasts a decrease in population and changes in population pyramid, an increase of dependants on the economically active population, a decrease in single-person households and also reduction in family size. It is estimated that the size of the population will decrease to approximately between 75 million to 80 million in 2030 and 65 million to 70 million in 2050. Moreover, while the ageing population of those over 65 years old currently makes up 20% of the whole population, it is estimated that by the year 2060 this figure will rise to 33%, leading to a change in population structure. This is likely to happen as a result of low fertility and an increase in deaths.

The working age population is predicted to shrink by 27%-34% by 2060, and is likely to be followed by an increase in care costs of the ageing population. If child and youth care costs are also put into consideration then the dependants on the economically active population will be further increased. While an increase in elderly single-person households and single-person households is predicted to result in 41 million single housing units (Privathaushalte) by 2030, it is predicted the number will go down after 2025. The forecast shows a reduction in family size, with a bigger proportion of 1 or 2-person households.

Changes in Germany's family structure include a decrease in marriages, increase in divorces and diversified family form. After approximately 520,000 marriages were registered in the former West Germany in 1960, there was a continuous decrease with approximately 360,000 in 1985. In 1990 the figure grew again to 410,000 but after unification the numbers for registered marriages in East and West Germany stood at a mere 380,000 in 2010. It can be said that the decrease in registered marriages is due to individualized factors. While divorce was once rare it has now become a common notion with a changing society, and in 1950 there was a decrease in divorces in the former West Germany, with approximately 84,000, but the figures increased from 1965. After unification the figures rose to 200,000 in 2005 and in 2010 stood at 187,000. The structure of the family is affected by a decrease in marriages, increase in divorces, and as the formation and breaking up of relationships becomes standard practice.

The issues and forecast for family policy in Germany are related to an increased gap in care. The so-called 'Normal familie' consisting of parents and children is breaking up, and factors

such as employment instability, an increase in female employment and such new social risks are seen to contribute to a bigger gap in care, which is predicted to be a major social problem for Germany. The issue of a gap in care became visualized after 1995, with the introduction of the German long-term care insurance system, which enabled the government to collect statistical data of the number of people covered by the system. After the scheme was introduced in 1995 a staggering 2 million were covered by the insurance in the year 1999. For 2007, the number of care workers on a nationwide basis in Germany stood at 575,000, and based on this as a standard it is foreseen that there will be an insufficient number of care professionals to meet demand in 2050.

The UK showed an increase in population, which is higher than the EU average. From 2001 to 2010 the annual average population growth rate for the EU was 0.4% and for the UK 0.6%. From this, it can be seen that the UK birth rate is higher than Germany and other EU countries. As the average life expectancy is steadily increasing, the UK shows a slower pace of population ageing than Germany.

It is predicted that while the ageing population will increase along with an increase in average life expectancy, an increased birth rate and immigrant population means that unlike Germany, the UK's population pyramid is not likely to experience a rapid ageing in population. The results for demographic changes show the ratio for dependency on the working population to go from 612 in 2008 to 684 in 2083. However, this is lower than the early 1970s. In 2008 the birth rate reached 1.96, and this will likely stay around the 1.9 mark. The average number of family members per household will go from 2.34 in 2004 to 2.11 in 2026 and then 2.09 in 2029. A birth rate of below 2.0 and increase in ageing population will bring about such changes.

The UK family structure shows on one hand a steady decrease in marriages, and on the other remarriages and divorces are on the rise. The number of same-sex marriages and same-sex cohabiting couples, which did not exist in the past, have started to increase. The number of single-parents households has also gone up, 60% of which have children under adult age from marriage, and 14% from cohabiting. The increase of single-parent families and cycle of separation and reconciliation of married couples will become 'the norm' factor in changes in family structure and increases in living expenses, employment instability, child care costs and such economic factors are likely to be leading causes affecting the structure of the family. On the other hand, these problems have increased the need for family policy to help narrow the income gap among family types.

Looking at Germany and the UK has provided us with the outlook of the present and the future of the family in not only welfare states but also in West Europe, which is one of diversified family types, individualization, families placing more importance on child care than marriage. It also suggests that issues of the future family such as needs for strengthened network-forming outside the family, an increase of care workers, diverse accommodations in line with family size and

measuring of the impact of policy on changes in the family. In particular, the measuring of policy impact is necessary for the future family policy budget estimation.

### III. Forecast for Changes in the Korean Family

The family is undergoing a lot of changes in Korea. Environment scanning was used to investigate the main driving forces behind changes in the family, and the results found that these were low fertility, population ageing, intensification of an unstable economy, an increase in working women, a need for improved welfare and strengthened policy and development in science and technology number of people per convergence. Such factors are predicted to cause various changes to the family such as family type, function, relationships and roles of family members.

The Cohort Component Method was applied in order to estimate the future population, and the results show a reduction in the number of people per generation, an increase in marriage tension, and a maintained or increased number of households. Firstly, generation size is predicted to reduce further in 20 years' time in the year 2030. In 2030, the members of the population age 14 will stand at 398,576 but those at age 0 will only be 348,204. On the other hand, those at age 60 will account for 842,127, which will take up the largest proportion of the population. It is because the adult generation which had over 700,000 persons in each age group will become seniors in 2030. However, the average population by age group in 2030 will be reduced to 650,000 persons for the 30s group, 450,000 for the 20s group, and 400,000 for the 10-19 group.


Secondly, the marriage tension problem is predicted to increase. If the marriageable age remains at 32 for males and 29 for females as in 2010, males are likely to experience difficulty in getting married due to a smaller female population than male. If marriage only occurs among men and women of suitable marriage age, then 2030 will likely see 18% of males at marriageable age unable to get married. The marriage tension problem which occurred after 2010 will likely see a temporary ease in 2020 and then arise again afterwards. It is predicted this will bring about an increase in international marriages and changes or easing of marriageable age.

Thirdly, household numbers will either be maintained or increase. The pace of increase will alleviate until 2030 but figures will steadily increase. It can be said this is related to the decrease in average number household members. While the number of average household members will go from 2.77 in 2010 to 2.34 in 2030, the total number of households will go from 17,339,422 in 2010 to 20,468,970 in 2030. As such, married couples, single-person households and such small family types will arise and these family types will highly increase in the senior age group.

The results of survey on professionals and scenario techniques using simulation also pointed to similar results. The survey on professionals had responses from 96 participants (73 from

academia, 20 from the research field and 3 from the media field), and results show changes in the future family in three domains in order of lifestyle, family rituals and perception of family. The predictive factors were found to be in the order of: demographic structure, method of labor and work environment, values and women's status, science and technology (including natural environments such as the ecosystem) and domestic and international external environment (including politics, economy, unification and such).

Demographic structure, which appeared as a domain for change in the future family and first place for factors affecting family environment change, was focused on for simulation and lower-ranking variables related to population structure factors and which were selected by professionals were immigrants, population ageing, marriage rates and divorce rates. The results of the simulation were converted into scenarios, which are as follows. The changes in population structure include an increase in immigrants, population ageing, decrease in marriage rates and increase in divorce rates. For family environment, results show changes in lifestyle in eating habits, with a high possibility of more families eating out rather than in the home. In terms of weddings, the focus will highly likely change from being family-oriented to couple-oriented, and for family perceptions, the focus will also turn to married couples.



#### Simulation Results for Changes in Population Structure and Family Environment

Diversified horizontal relationships will be a basis for the future family. However, such diversification has a high possibility of reducing the existing boundaries of families, which will result in a need for organizations and systems which can substitute the support provided by existing families.

The driving forces behind family changes found through using the environment scanning method, the future family outlook found through the Cohort Component Method and the results of the simulation drawn from the scenario technique indicate a need to consider changes in

the population size and age, gender imbalance and low fertility in addition to changes in household structure for gender equality and family policy planning in 2030.

#### IV. Forecast for Korea's Future Perceptions and Society

This section looks at results from a survey on Korean citizens' perceptions of the future family and forecasts for the future society. An analysis was carried out on the Korean people's thoughts of the time frame of the future, individual preparations for the future, individual perceptions on current and future state and a general forecast of Korean society and changes in family lifestyle.

Firstly, in relation to the time frame of the future, respondents thought that the 'future' was a time an average of 14.6 years later. 41.5% answered that the time frame for the future was in 'less than 6-10 years' and 28.6% 'less than 11-20 years'. It was found that respondents in the younger age group and with higher average household incomes perceived the future to be longer.

Secondly, preparation for the future in terms of economic, social, self-development, health and body, psychological and emotional domains was looked at. Results show that apart from the health and body domain, respondents were not prepared for the future. Such results showed a certain difference according to age, sex and household income.

Thirdly, regarding their opinions on their individual future forecasts (around 2030), 56.7% answered they were 'somewhat optimistic', followed by 'not sure' (26.5%), 'somewhat pessimistic' (10.7%), 'very optimistic' (5.0%) and 'very pessimistic' (1.1%). The older the age group, and the lower the average household income, the more negative the respondents were towards the future.

Fourth, the perceived current and future state of individuals in 2030, in relation to social status, income levels, state of health, family relations, family economic standards, was looked at. Results show a prevalence in the prediction that the future will show improved states. However, individuals' state of health and family relations were perceived to get worse. Meaningful results could be found in all categories of the survey in the results for perceptions of current and future state of self and the difference in household income. It can be seen that the higher the household income, the more optimistic respondents were towards the present and the future.

Fifth, survey respondents foresee that in around 2030, present social conditions will intensify or increase, these being divorce rates, gender equality, number of migrant labor workers, youth unemployment, resource exhaustion, new technology advancement and space development. A high number of respondents believed that labor hours, stability of employment, number of jobs and conflict between the North and South such factors would remain at the same levels as today. Also, the biggest affecting factor on Korean society in the future was seen to be the fertility rate (16.9%), followed by new technology development (15.7%) and youth unemployment (13.1%). For main factors affecting family life, respondents answered with fertility



rate (34.1%), divorce rate (32.3%) and gender equality (8.5%), which were similar results to the survey on professionals. However, gender equality was regarded more importantly by regular citizens than professionals.

Lastly, with relation to changes to family life, respondents were asked about male and female roles, the openness of family formation and changes to lifestyle should the North and South reunite. For male and female roles, respondents thought that females would equal males in diverse fields in 20 years time. In terms of family formation, respondents believed the future would see more sole-person households or households including members of other ethnic groups and the openness of attitudes towards sex. Should North and South Korea reunite, it is foreseen that social conflict would arise as a result in differences in family values and culture between the two Koreas, and that the cost of unification would lead to aggravated economic conditions. On the other hand, other respondents thought that unification would improve the status of women within the family and added diversity to lifestyle factors such as food, clothing and shelter.

## V. Forecast of the Family Future and Acceptance Towards the Future Family

Based on the survey carried out among regular Korean citizens, this section aims to capture a specific picture of what constitutes individuals' hopes for the future family. The forecasts for the family future showed almost no differences between groups and were relatively consistent. However, differences could be seen in acceptance towards the family according to age, educational attainment and social class.

Firstly, the majority of survey respondents considered their children's life and success to be that of their own. However, even though the importance of parents' support for their children was recognized, this can be felt as a burden. As a result, in 20 years' time Koreans will see the current roles of parents as lifelong supporters and providers of unlimited support fade. Aside from a minority, most respondents expressed the same opinion.

Secondly, for people's attitudes towards the change in roles for caring for parents, which is an important issue for the relationship between parents and children, respondents generally thought that the future would see either a weakening of the current direct and face-to-face care being provided or a stop at the current standard. Approximately 61% of the respondents predicted an increase in reliance on their children in elderly parents as a result of the ageing population, and 74% foresee this to lead to increased conflict between people and their parents. Although the rapid increase in the use of cellular phones bringing added convenience to modern society, on the other hand it is predicted that this will also bring about less face-to-face contact and time spent together for family members. Recent competition for new developments in cellular phones needs to be looked at from a social sciences viewpoint, in relation to how these developments are affecting

the relationship between humans and how these are formed.

Thirdly, in relation to people's attitudes towards ancestral and funeral rites, results show that it is thought traditional ancestral rites will be discontinued, (56.7% answered No and 43.3% Yes.), and the extent of participation in funeral rites will be at a lesser scale than the present (No: 32.5% and Yes: 67.5%). The meaning of ancestral rite, which stems from Confucian beliefs of paternal ancestry and the idea of attending to one's ancestors is changing to that of a family function for the purpose of remembering close family relations who have passed away. Funeral rites are predicted to become more simplified in both form and procedure, but more meaningful and directly relevant to individuals.

Next, in terms of wedding ceremonies, the scale of participants will likely reduce, and the ceremony itself is likely to become more simplified. Wedding gifts given to the groom's family will also reduce, and the division of gender-specific roles will also likely disappear. Such results show that while in the past weddings were an affair for the two families, the future will see it being more an event for the family to celebrate the coming together of the two individuals. Overall, the average Korean citizen does not believe that ancestral and funeral rites as well as wedding ceremonies will completely cease to exist.

Many believed that there will be a decrease in family gatherings during national holidays where ancestral rites are conducted by male members of the family for paternal ancestry, and female members prepare food. However, around 30% of the respondents believed things would remain the same as now, and some hoped these traditions would stay the same.

For the eating habits of families, it is predicted there will be less traditional culinary routines such as making sauces and kimchi or eating in and preparing food together. Also, 54.2% responded that there will be a reduction in people producing their own ingredients for cooking while 30% thought this would be continued. Simple and convenient substitutes for meals will also be more widely used in addition to an increased demand for slow food and healthy eating.

In terms of accommodation, it is believed there will be increased designs of smart housing build around automated function for increased convenience and housing where three generations of a family can live both separately and together. It is also predicted there will be less apartments and such multi-unit dwelling types while detached housing will become more popular. It is also thought that affordable housing with attached gardens will go on the rise. A means of residence with an increase in community spaces and improved community spirit between neighbors is also predicted.

Lastly, a high number of respondents believed that leisure time will increase, leisure time will be spent alone or with friends and colleagues more than family, and people will meet with others in more diverse ways online. Respondents believe the main goal of leisure time will lie with rest and relaxation while entertainment and self-development were also predicted to increase. 78.0% of respondents agreed that paid, commercialized leisure services will be made available.

## VI. Acceptance Towards a Variety of Family Types? and Prediction of Family Function

This section aims to analyze the differences in perceptions towards family among groups through in-depth analysis of a prominent difference in acceptance towards family among groups. The acceptance of Koreans towards various future family types was looked at. Results show the lowest acceptance towards entering animal companions onto the family register and leaving them inheritance, with less than 20% accepting respondents. The second least accepted idea was the one of meeting one's spouse in cyberspace, and leading a double life both in the real and cyber worlds, which accounted for 20.6%. However, a relatively high number of respondents were accepting of the idea of a human robot as a member of the family, which accounted for 24.1% of responses.


The idea most accepted by Koreans was that of individuals unrelated by blood forming a family and living together, followed by single males or females who give birth to and raise children with the help of a sperm or egg donor. However, acceptance was extremely low towards the idea of couples without conception problems using a surrogate mother, indicating wariness towards the high risk of family formation methods becoming commercialized. However, the fact that there is high acceptance towards families consisting of individuals non-related by blood shows a family culture which is becoming increasingly individualized.

In response to questions regarding family types which will show the largest growth in the forthcoming 20 years, 26.3% chose sole-person elderly households, which was followed by unmarried male and female sole-person households (15.1%), dual-income families (12.4%), couples without children (11.1%), multiracial families (9.5%) and single parent families (6.6%). This confirms the individualization of families and care for children and the elderly remaining as an important issue for policy. Also, with regard to households which will most likely need government support in the forthcoming 20 years, results came in the following order: sole-person elderly households 43.8%, families consisting of grandchildren living with their grandparents (16.0%), single parent families (10.0%) and multiracial families (8.2%). It is noteworthy that these family types are those currently selected for policy planning.

A relatively high number of respondents showed a positive response towards various ways of family formation, such as marriage and childbirth, married life, remarriage and such. 61.1% were positive towards not marrying and living alone and 50.6% for cohabiting, which shows a low tendency to be tied to the norms regarding marriage. Conversely, regarding questions for the relationship between marriage and childbirth, 35.9% of respondents were supportive of having a child without being married and 47.7% of being married but not having children, which are relatively low percentages. 78.2% were for international marriages while only 16.2% supported same-sex marriage. However, a surprisingly low 41.3% of respondents felt positive towards married couples apart

from each other. 74.6% were for child adoption and 80.1% for remarriage.

Lastly, using cluster analysis, an attempt was made to classify subgroups with differing viewpoints in relation to acceptance towards family formation types. Results show four group formations. Those belonging to Group 1 were those with high degrees of acceptance for both types, and mainly consisted of the young generation in their 20s and 30s and high-income earners. Also, a characteristic of this group is that the majority were females educated at university level or above. Group 2, which accounts for the largest proportion, shows low acceptance on both sides with very low non-normative acceptance. This group consisted mainly of people in their 50s and 60s in the low-income bracket educated at middle school or lower. Group 3 were accepting towards the diversity of family formation, but not non-normative family formation. This group consisted of those with mid-level income and education. Group 4 consisted of those with low acceptance levels for both sides and due to the very small distribution of this group, no particular characteristics were obvious.




Cluster Grouping of Family Formation Acceptance

The discovery of such groups could be useful in the future for modifying the scale and pace of family fluctuations, when persuasion is needed for preferential agreement or counseling, and to know who the main targets are for counseling or campaigns and such specific policy application.

## VII. The Forecast for the Future Family and Policy Direction and Tasks

OECD members see changes in the family environment in a decrease in institutional marriages, increase in the working female population, a new balance of gender roles, and gaps in care. Factors changing the Korean family include low fertility, population ageing, an increase in the working female population, an increase in the immigrant population, a decrease in marriages and increase in divorces. Professionals forecast smaller generations in the future family, an increase in marriage tension, increase in eating out, marriages centering on the couple and couple-oriented family relationships. Finally, Koreans perceive the future family to be one with a decrease in unlimited support between parents and offspring and direct providing roles. Informationalization is predicted to reduce face-to-face time between family members and ancestral rites, funeral rites and wedding customs will also lessen to a smaller scale. In particular, it was discovered that a group in the 20s-30s age range who are high-income earners with high educational attainment have high levels of acceptance towards family formation types. The diagram below shows a summary.



Based on these findings, policy results are as follows.

First of all, due to changes in population size and structure the following types of policy are needed. Most importantly, family policy meeting the needs of those in the 20-30s age group who are likely to give birth needs to be developed. As a group with high levels of acceptance towards family, it is important to devise policy which increases the attractiveness of marriage and childbirth rather than focusing on these as norms. Secondly, changes in population structure means increased conflict between generations, races and classes. In order to resolve such conflict, not only is socially-integrated infrastructure required, but a social and economic safety net for senior citizens also needs to be expanded, as this group will take up a large proportion of the future population. Thirdly, policy to resolve the marriage tension problem for those who are affected as a result of the gender birth ratio due to a preference for males. In order to make marriage more attractive to women, policy which ensures no conflict between female employment and marriage is needed. Fourth, foreign residents will make up a large proportion of the future population, and therefore support systems for multiracial families need to be maintained and policy which guarantees their human rights and meets their welfare needs also needs to be devised.

Next, in order to prepare for changes in the household structure the following policies are needed. Firstly, diversification and strengthening of housing welfare policy is needed in line with the reduction in family size and increase of sole-person households. Elderly sole-person households will largely increase, so considerations need to be made for corresponding housing policy. The elderly welfare housing, which is part of the present housing policy for elderly households, needs to be further diversified and invigorated. Due to a decrease in generations, it is possible most households will not have an adult generation and therefore in order to improve the policy approachability for this area, a strengthened information delivery system is needed. Elderly administration guides or youth administration guides and such administrative support needs to be strengthened and as such a system needs to be implemented.

The tasks to deal with changes in the future family lifestyle are as follows. First, the proactive participation of males and social responsibility towards family care is needed. If we consider the forecast of rapidly decreasing face-to-face contact between elderly parents and their adult children due to advancement into a high-tech society, development and implementation of programs for diverse emotional and relationship support is needed across society. Secondly, in order to satisfy the needs for family closeness and family community spirit, the community needs to set up various locations where families can gather to spend time together and a system which supports this is needed. Also, spatial design needs to be considered for multi-unit housing or housing which enables all three generations of a family to both live together and separately. Third, a support system for funeral rites needs to be put in place in preparation for elderly people dying alone and deaths in sole-person households. Support for funerals along with management and supervision of commercial funeral services need to be established. In

accordance with the forecast that there will be an increase in leisure time and paid leisure services, a public system needs to be put in place to reduce the possible gap between income and leisure quality, to develop social leisure along with self-development leisure to satisfy needs.