

Gender Differences in Values and Political Orientations: A Comparison of Korea and Japan

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ABSTRACT

Using the 4th wave of the World Values Survey data, this paper examines the extent of the gender-gap in social values and political orientations in two non-Western nations, Korea and Japan. The core emphasis of the paper is on whether political socialization and situational hypotheses have reduced gender inequality in some attitudes — values, psychological involvement, political cynicism, elite-challenging activities — that are important for political activity. The findings indicate that both socialization and situational explanations are still relevant in these two Asian nations. Specifically uncovered are: 1) Korean women are less likely to exhibit modern values and political orientations (except for protest) than their Japanese counterparts; 2) regardless of age and education, single Korean women are more likely to possess modern values, whereas single Japanese counterparts are less likely to participate in protest activity than one being married, 3) intra-sex differences in psychological involvement in politics and political cynicism among both women fade when age and education are held constant.

Key words: gender gap, social values, psychological involvement in politics, political cynicism, protest action, socialization hypothesis, situational explanation.

1. Introduction.

There is an extensive literature that has developed over the past three decades that documents quite conclusively that women's values have been changing in the advanced industrial democracies in ways that are significantly impacting on political attitudes and behavior. Particularly, the increased participation of women in the work force as well as changing patterns of political participation have created a tension between traditional values and demands for change.

While the literature on gender politics is a "growth industry," it has almost exclusively focused on the women of Western Europe and North America. Most studies on Asian women have neither examined systematically the extent of the gender gap issues nor created a framework for analysis that generated questions about whether the gender gap represents new or changing political orientations among Asian women. This article

will explore the extent of the gender-gap in social values and political orientations in two non-Western nations at different levels of economic development, South Korea (hereafter referred to only as Korea) and Japan.

Both of these nations can be classified as strong states with traditionally deferential and compliant population. Women in both countries, consequently, have a long tradition of female subordination and exclusion from public life. This unfavorable tradition for women has a deep root in Confucianism, which sees all human relations in the light of a vertical relationship, such as the relationships between ruler and ruled, father and son, husband and wife, and the old and young.

On the one hand, we believe that two societies are still under the influence of traditional authoritarianism where sex roles are sharply differentiated. On the other hand, constraints on women's politicization, such as legal reform, altered family structures, improved access to education and generational replacement, manifest themselves in both places. It is our contention that changes in mass attitudes and values in general and women's in particular have been a crucial explanatory variable in accounting for recent democratizing changes particularly in Korea. Thus, it is an interesting task to investigate the extent to which traditional Confucian values persist or are modified in Korea, and their influence upon Korean women's politicization, and to compare this to the Japanese case.

This analysis will proceed at three interconnected areas. What theories explain why and on what issues men and women in western countries might have different values and political orientations? What in Korea and Japan indicate that these variations can be expected to exist? From the fourth wave of the

World Values Survey data, what evidence is there of gender-based orientation differences? In short, this study will expand research on gender differences in values and political orientations developed in western industrial democracies and use new evidence from two East Asian societies. This analysis thus looks as broadly as the data set permits at the relationships between values and other measures of political engagement: psychological involvement, confidence in a variety of major political institutions, and political protest.

2. Gender Differences in Values and Political Attitudes

There have been persistent arguments that the gender gap divides most women from men. Most studies of the gender gap in public opinion show that men and women have different political values and priorities which stem from fundamental value differences (see, for example, Friedan and Dector, 1982; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Tolleson Rinehart, 1992; Norris and Lovenduski, 1993; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Dalton, 2006). How do they differ? Some feminist theorists (e.g., Stoper and Johnson, 1977) argue that women, compared to men, embrace morally superior values. Others argue that women approach ethical problems differently from men. Carol Gilligan (1982), for instance, argues that women are more oriented toward interpersonal relationships, and that this results in a conception of morality that stresses caring and responsibility toward others. In contrast, men are more concerned with rights and rules, and thus they emphasize justice and fairness in their moral decisions (Tronto, 1987; Noddings, 1984).

Most of literature on political behavior of the

1950s and 1960s indicated that women were less interested and involved in politics than were men and had less of a feeling that they could take an active role in political life. Differences were also noted in regard to attitudes on certain political issues. Studies showed that women were more moralistic (Lane, 1959) and more interested in local social welfare issues, from parks and libraries to schools, traffic lights, clean water, and social legislation (Gruberg, 1968). The idea that women may be less interested in political issues and more politically intolerant, moralistic, or concerned with social welfare issues has continued to appear in more recent studies (Inglehart, 1981; Imamura, 1987; Gelb and Palley, 1991; CAWP, 1997; Kaufmann, 2002). Within the last decade, the idea that women's political attitudes are different from men's has received still more attention as a result of discussions of the "gender gap."

Why do women's values differ from those of men? How do such value differences manifest themselves in political orientations? There may be competing explanations on differences in male-female attitudes. Political socialization explanation is one of them which can be divided into two sub-groups: one group emphasizes the importance of early socialization process; the other focuses adult socialization. According to the former, political socialization leads to values early in childhood (e.g., Jaros, 1973; Greenstein, 1965). Child psychologists used to think that changes in fundamental values after childhood were rare. In this context, women are socialized into a more politically passive role than men, or at least less represented in the political arena. At the same time, the traditional gender role socialization prescribes women's concern with the well-being of others

and, hence, a preference for policies that seem to extend that concern. Jaros (1973, p. 44), for instance, argues that the relative nonparticipation of women results in large part from a set of norms that women hold that they should not participate as much as men, that politics is a man's game. "There is a cultural tradition of feminine nonparticipation transmitted in childhood."

Less validity of this child socialization argument has been supported by numerous empirical findings (see, for example, Easton and Dennis, 1969; Orum, Grassmuck, and Orum, 1974). If we assume Confucian culture still exists in these two Asian countries, a noticeable gender-gap in values and political orientations, regardless of socio-demographic factors such as education and intergenerational replacement, would be expected as a result of aspects of socialization.

Proponents of adult socialization, on the other hand, argue that people's attitudes and behavior are not fixed. But in fact, people change their views more often. This can happen because people change their residence, or because they experience severe economic depression, or because they develop views that conflict with their original values. On the issue of gender role socialization, they argue that males and females were socialized in different ways, but that this socialization experience has changed over a period of time. According to them, the Women's Rights Movement, 1975 International Women's Year, for instance, gave stimuli to political participation by women. If this explanation has merit, then we would expect to find that differences in values and politicization between males and females occur only for certain groups of females that are most likely to be influenced by the older socialization tradition, such as older and less

⁴⁴ Refer to Won (1994, pp207-208) for a brief comparison between ancient Confucian and neo-Confucian views of women. Note that while the Confucian culture has been a, if not the, dominant tradition, both Japan and Korea share a Buddhist, a Christian, and indigenous traditions in which women's roles are at variance with that dictated by the Confucians. The Confucian tradition was imposed for political

reasons relatively recently (say, the last three hundred years) by Spartan regimes. Many men and women, especially in Korea, but also in Japan, outwardly conform to the requirements but privately hold other views, dictated by their Christianity, Buddhism or even indigenous values.

educated women. One of our concerns here is to test this relationship.

Another explanation of the political effects of gender comes from the "situational hypothesis" (Verba, 1965; Pomper, 1975; Andersen, 1975). According to this hypothesis, the female roles of wife and mother keep women isolate, busy, and concerned more with their own private affairs than with public issues (Jennings, 1983; Duverger, 1955; Sapiro, 1983; Welch, 1977). By working outside the home, women gain information, skills for action, qualifications for leadership, and a basis for interest in politics. Presumably their political attitudes change as well. Empirical research has shown that women who work outside the home are more liberal or feminist in regard to sex roles and equal opportunity (Andersen and Cook, 1985). Thus, this hypothesis would argue that the presence of children and the absence of a work role outside the home inhibits women's political participation. This is another hypothesis this paper will examine.

Before proceeding any further, we believe that a genuine understanding of contemporary Korean and Japanese women's socio-political attitudes requires, first of all, an examination of how Confucian culture portrayed society in general and women's role in particular.

3. Characteristics of Confucian Korean and Japanese Women

How women's role had been portrayed in the traditional Confucian, especially neo-Confucian, culture?⁴⁴ Susan Pharr (1981), in her *Political Women in Japan*, clearly documents the traditional view of women's role in Confucian culture. According to Pharr

(1981, pp. 47-52), the traditional view of women's role has three basic features that had a particular impact on the lives of women in traditional Japan, and still remains influential in every woman's life in contemporary Japan. We believe that Korean women share this view of women's role as well (Choi, 1994; Cho, 1994; Palley, 1994).

The first feature of the traditional view of women's role, considered to be natural and legitimate, is the degree of status differences between men and women. Before World War II, women showed deference to the men of their own as well as of higher classes through: use of polite language and honorific forms of address; bowing more deeply than men; walking behind their husbands in public, and in numerous other ways deferring to the men. Ideally, in the extended family arrangement common in the prewar period, a new bride coming into the house was expected to acknowledge her inferior status in a number of ritualized ways. For instance, she gets up first in the morning, goes to bed last at night, eats after other family members, and takes the least choice servings of food.

The second feature of the traditional view, supported not only in custom but in legal codes until the end of World War II, was the husband's authority over the wife. Upon a husband's death, the authority over his wife was transferred to his eldest male offspring (Paulson, 1976, pp. 10-13). This rigid traditional custom was very much reflected in the 1958 Civil Code in Korea which consistently favored husband in provisions relating to divorce, marriage, property rights, and other questions coming under the Family Law (Lee, 1989, pp. 300-301).⁴⁵ Basically, a

⁴⁵ Recent changes in the Family Law (effective 1 January 1991) eliminated some differential inheritance provisions that had enabled eldest sons to inherit more property than did other children of the widow. After partial revisions, the patrilineal family headship, which was the symbol of gender inequality, eventually was eliminated in the

2005 revision. Yet the modified Family Law still defines relationships in a women's family different than those of a man's, and restricts marriage between people of the same regional origin or surname, even though they may be only very distantly related. Available at (<http://www.klaw.go.kr>).

married woman could act in legal matters only with the approval of her husband's family, as in the prewar family system where the head of household assumed full legal responsibility for all family members. Consequently, most women spent their entire lifetime before and after marriage as legal dependents of male family heads. This is still very much prevalent in Korea today.

While much earlier in Japan, compared to Korea, women gained limited rights to divorce, to own property, to maintain custody of children, and to become the head of a household by the Meiji Civil Code (Paulson, 1976, p.15), these rights were, however, subject to qualifications. In any case, women were subservient to men and married woman's existence was controlled by her husband's family.

The last feature of the traditional view that strongly affects beliefs today was the notion that husband and wife belong in separate spheres of activity (Gelb and Palley, 1991; Paulson, 1976). Activities of women were restricted to domestic affairs within the house and activities of men outside the house. Gender-role divisions were rigid especially among the upper classes. Upper-class married women played few roles in affairs outside the home circle and neighborhood (Kim, 1976, p. 84; Cho, 1994, pp. 209-211). Still today, the wife is often called "person inside the home," while the husband, "person outside the home" (Imamura, 1987, p.14). This inequality between men and women, rigid sexual division of labor between men and women, and the patriarchal structure of the family system, all were retained unchanged in the post war period (Lee, 1989, p. 298; Imamura, 1987).

Overall, all three aspects of the traditional view contributed to delineation of women's positions in public life in general and in politics in particular. The denial of political rights to women, we believe, was the logical outgrowth of the position of male family heads by the way of female family members. Given the clear division between the roles allocated to husbands and wives respectively, it was seen as reasonable or somewhat natural for one family member, namely the male head, to have complete monopoly over a given role, in this case the political role. The denial of women's legal right to participate in politics was a reflection of widely shared attitudes about the proper roles of men and women in the family and society.

In short, traditional role relationships and status expectations are often used to justify a limited role for women in both Korea and Japan. Women have been alienated from political reality. In many ways the traditional sex discrimination still remains strong in the lives of both Koreans and Japanese today. It is difficult to change role relationships in both nations since the vast majority of women including so called 'political women' accept the legitimacy of these traditional status relationships (Gelb and Palley, 1991).

4. Korean and Japanese Women's Socio-Economic and Political Status

The traditional view of a woman's role, however, has been challenged from many sides in the postwar period. First of all, its inception of the Republic of Korea in 1948 created a new situation for Korean women.

Discrimination against a woman in terms of

⁴⁶ The number of college entrants as a proportion of the total number of females who graduated from lower secondary school three years prior to a given year.

⁴⁷ For 2 year junior college level, the enrollment rates are reversed: 21% for women, only 2% for men in 1985. See Brinton (1988, p. 322).

her rights, access to job, education and marriage is prohibited by the new Constitution. Moreover, with the full-fledged national movement for the modernization of the 1960's, which called for massive participation of the female workforce, women emerged as major contributors to national development. Now, women constitute a large portion of the labor force. For instance, while 26.8 percent of women and 73.5 percent of men were participants in the labor force in 1960, the numbers were changed to 50.3 percent of women and 74.1 percent of men by 2000 (KWDI, 1991, p. 29, 2006; United Nations ESCAP, 2008).

In Japan, a series of laws also provided an equality for women after the post war period. Particularly, the Revised Civil Code of 1947 changed the position of women within the family. Women are now at least legally assured equal property rights, freedom of marriage, and equal grounds for divorce. The female labor-force participation rate also reached to about 43.7 percent of all Japanese women in 2000 (Gelb and Palley, 1994, p. 9; United Nations ESCAP, 2008).

The patterns and cycles of women's lives have also changed fundamentally in the process of industrialization and urbanization. The national economic development plans in both nations have resulted in bringing about a prolonged life expectancy, widely-practiced family planning, and simplified housework. Furthermore, today's women are better educated, work outside the home, raise fewer children, and live in a nuclear family. More importantly, the expansion of higher educational opportunities has also helped to reshape women's consciousness, by ameliorating women's own beliefs of their inferiority and acceptance of men's superiority.

Looking at the enrollment ratio in Korea, the enrollment ratios at the levels of elementary and middle schools, for instance, reached 100% for both boys and girls as of 1985. The male-female enrollment ratio gap tends to be narrowed at the high school level, while the relative difference has been rather widened at the level of higher education. We also observe that from 1985 to 1998 the enrollment rate at the college level for women rose about 2.4 times, while the enrollment rate for men rose 1.8 times. Currently, 83 college-aged men and 81 college-aged women out of 100 each enrolled in colleges or universities in 2006 (KWDI, 1998, 2006; WBG, 2007).

While rates of high school enrollment for Japanese men and women equalized around 1970, the growth in enrollment at institutions of postsecondary education has been especially striking in the case of females. The proportion of females in the relevant age group entering college rose from just 5.5 percent in 1960 to 18 percent in 1970, 33.5 percent in 1986, to 39.2 percent in 1991, and 50.7 percent in 2004 (Web Japan, 2008; WBG, 2007).⁴⁶ Although these figures appear impressive, it seems clear that men's and women's educational paths diverge sharply after high school: significantly more men (95%) go on to four-year universities than do women (40%) in 1990⁴⁷ (Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda, 1994, p. 46). Nevertheless, over the periods from 1970 to 1985, the enrollment rate for women rose more than twice, while that for men rose slightly more than half. This indicates that more women, together with men, are getting college education in both nations, consequently narrowing the relative enrollment ratio gap between men and women in higher education by the early 2000s.

It is also important to look at the

⁴⁸ The term "traditional-modern" values is used rather broadly in this study. Modern values facilitate self-actualization by assigning a higher priority to authority, openness, and self-betterment, whereas traditional orientations and modes of behavior are values that inhibit self-

actualization. It should be stressed here that the T-M values dimension represents a continuum, along which populations will be found to be continuously distributed from one extreme to the other, with many falling towards the middle only slightly to one side or the other.

representation of women at the elite level because women's success rate at the elite level is the ultimate measure of women's acceptance in political life. In Korea, women's gains at the elite level are extremely low in an absolute sense. But the percentage of seats held by women in the parliamentary elections has remained in the range of 0.5 to 6 percent over the last five decades, although the pattern is not consistent. Only two women candidates were elected in the 1985 parliamentary election and ten in the 2004 election (KWID, 2006). In the local legislative elections, the percentage of women who gained seats at the county and provincial levels ranged from 0.9% in 1991 to 2.3% in 2002.

In Japan, percentage of women elected to the Diet ranged from 3.6% in 1986 to 10% in 2003. In the local assembly elections, the percentage seats have remained in the range of 2 to 7% from 1984 to 2002. (JIN, 2003). Although their successes have been limited, Japanese women seem to be making more headway albeit slowly and incrementally, into electoral politics than Korean women.

Based on the above statistical figures, then, we can infer that women have been restrained from being engaged in economic and political activity, while women's consciousness, mainly due to education and participation in socio-economic arena, may appear to have been much improved. While recently both in Korea and Japan, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act became law in 1988 and 1985 respectively, realization of women's rights has not been yet reached. We can thus infer that the die-hard Korean and Japanese institutions embodied in law and customs have poorly responded to changes.

Basically, then, what we have is the institutional sexism. As a consequence, women

are discriminated against in various areas of society. We, therefore, argue that women in Korea and Japan have cultivated an apolitical tendency without being aware of it because of the prevailing politico-cultural milieu which encourages it. They have been told that women should stay away from politics because such matters should be dealt with by men (Gelb and Palley, 1991).

5. Methods

The analysis in this paper is based on the Korean (N=1,200) and Japanese (N=1,362) samples of the World Values Survey conducted in 2001 and 2000, respectively. In them are numerous behavioral and attitudinal indicators. Four sets of measures are created from these data: a measure of the Traditional-Modern (T-M) values, a measure of Psychological Involvement (PI), a measure of political cynicism, and a measure of protest potential.

First of all, the present study identifies and constructs a social value dimension which might loosely represent the concept of Traditional-Modern (T-M) rubric broadly defined.⁴⁸ As Conover (1988, p. 992) argues, there are two reasons for investigating a gender gap in social values: (1) it helps to explain the gender gap that already exists in specific policy preference; (2) such values as egalitarianism are essential to political expression of that perspective. Through factor analysis procedures, twelve items were identified as tapping the traditional-modern value dimension.

Moderns here stress autonomy, openness, self-assertiveness, self-pursuit, participation, free speech and independence, while Traditionals emphasize order, obedience, conformity to traditional morals and values, self-sacrifice, and advocating traditional women's roles. All twelve items/scales have been rescaled so that they range from 1 to 10; high scores indicate a strong commitment to modern values.

⁴⁸ Our non-traditional women's role scale was derived from five items - whether women need children to be fulfilled, whether the role of housewife is as fulfilling as having a job, whether work, which takes mothers out of the home, is good or bad for their children, and two

items that essentially ask whether man make better political leaders than woman do, or a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.

Additive scales based on the items selected through the above factor analytic procedures were constructed using simple additive procedures for appropriate analysis. It is believed that these additive scales would give a more comprehensive indication of the conceptual dimension we are measuring than any of the individual items. Each item is given an equal weight in the scale.

Only two items related to the Psychological Involvement (PI) are available in both surveys. The psychological involvement scale is composed of two items tapping the level of interest in politics and the frequency of political discussion. The World Values Survey also provides this analysis six items tapping political cynicism or system trust. Respondents were asked whether they have confidence in the armed forces, the government, the police, parliament, political parties, and civil service. Lastly, the analysis is able to measure and compare the gender gap in the willingness to engage in protest action by employing four different kinds of activities from signing a petition, joining in boycotts, through attending lawful demonstrations, to more extreme forms of protest such as joining unofficial strikes.

In all instances, the relevant items have been recoded so that high scores indicate the political orientations most congruent with a modern perspective. Specifically, in the PI arena high scores indicate an active interest in politics and frequently discuss politics. For further analysis, all three scales were constructed by standardizing, equally weighing, and combining the respective items.

Three major hypotheses are formulated for a test: 1) Men tend to hold more modern values and political orientations than women; 2) Among women, those with either high education or younger age, or both are more

likely to have developed modern socio-political orientations than those with either low education or old age, or both. We might further propose that the highly educated females are likely to show the same, if not more, amount of attitudes towards the social and political domains as the male counterparts. These two hypotheses are indirectly related to the political socialization explanation; 3) The situational hypothesis might tell us that outside the home employment stimulates participation among working women (Andersen, 1975). We thus expect to find that non-housewives compared to typical housewives show quite different attitudes and behaviors toward society as well as politics. For an empirical analysis, age cohort-not generation and education are used to investigate the socialization hypothesis; an individual's marital status, albeit imperfect, to the situational hypothesis.

On another level, we also examine so called the development hypothesis, to see if it accounts for reduced gender inequality in attitudes important for political activity. The development hypothesis (also called modernization hypothesis) basically argues that gender inequality in political attitudes and behavior shrinks with economic development. If that hypothesis holds, we would expect to find that compared to Korean women, Japanese women, thanks to a bigger economic pie, evince a higher level of politicization, thereby reducing the gender gap in political attitudes and behavior.

6. Results

Our main research questions which then arise are: Are there any similarities and differences of orientations towards society in general and politics in particular between men and women?; what

about among women?; what —if any, how much — is the cross-national variation? We argued that the dominant Confucian ethic requires women to avoid public life. This also leads us to assume that women, compared to men, still tend to show more traditional attitudes toward their private as well as public life.

We tested the first hypothesis by computing the average scores for women and men separately for each value item. Do men and women differ in their social values? The evidence is mixed. If the socialization hypothesis is correct, we should expect male-female differences especially on items 3, 5, 8, 10, and 12 which broadly tap attitudes toward traditional gender roles — the idea of woman as a nurturer, caretaker, mothering, and respecting authority. Table 1 reports that there are significant differences at the .05 level between men and women on four items (2, 5, 9, 12) in Korea and six items (1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12) for the Japanese case.

<Table 1>
Male-Female Differences in Values

Item	Korea		Pearson's R	Japan		Pearson's R
	Male	Female		Male	Female	
1. Protect freedom of speech	1.84	1.92	.02	2.29	1.97*	-.10**
2. Give people more say in govt. decisions	4.11	3.51*	-.09**	6.20	6.59	.05
3. Teach child independence and imagination	6.13	5.85	-.05	6.62	6.01*	-.11**
4. Prefer job where can use initiative	8.42	8.17	-.04	6.26	4.95*	-.15**
5. Parents should have own life	5.10	5.77*	.08**	4.92	4.95	.04
6. Divorce, abortion, prostitution and homosexuality sometimes justified	3.14	3.32	.05	4.43	4.43	.00
7. Have control over own life	7.05	7.24	.04	6.03	5.97	-.01
8. Less respect for authority	7.11	7.17	.01	8.84	8.76	-.02
9. Maintaining order in the nation less important	4.41	4.92*	.07**	5.24	5.91*	.09**
10. Child obedience discouraged	8.78	8.85	.01	9.71	9.51*	-.06**
11. No duty to love & respect parents regardless	1.66	1.74	.02	3.50	3.62	.02
12. Non-traditional women's roles	4.68	5.17*	.20**	5.35	5.75*	.14**
Mean		5.20	5.30		5.78	5.70

*T-test significant at the .05 level.

**Pearson's r between gender and each item significant at the .05 level.

When examining items 3, 5, 7, and 10 carefully, these four represent more personal and private domains compared to other items. Like other studies (Rokeach, 1973; Christenson and Dunlap, 1984; Conover, 1988), this analysis fails to find consistent gender differences in the importance accorded values of autonomy, self-assertiveness and child obedience: Only three (items 3, 5, 10) out of four items are significant in either sample. Similarly, Conover (1988), for instance, using the 1985 National Election Study Pilot, finds that men and women do not significantly differ in their values: Women as a whole are no more or no less egalitarian, individualistic, racist, or liberal than men. On the two child rearing items, Japanese respondents gave more liberal responses than Korean counterparts.

Women do differ from men, though. The patterns that emerge for the Japanese case are the ones that we would expect. Japanese women exhibit significantly lower scores (traditional) than men on three items: Women are less likely than men to feel that protecting freedom of speech is important; less likely to consider

teaching children independence and imagination important; less likely to prefer job where an opportunity to use initiative is available; and more likely to think teaching child obedience important. On the other hand, Japanese women are more likely to believe that maintaining order in the nation is less important and that non-traditional women's roles⁴⁹ are as, if not more, important as traditional ones.

What is most striking is the fact that the pattern for the Korean women is reversed on three items. While the average score for women (5.30) on all twelve value items is slightly higher than that for men (5.20), women displayed more modern attitudes than did men on three items: parents should have own life, maintaining order in the nation is less important, stronger support for non-traditional women's roles. Beyond doubt, Korean women's attitudes towards non-traditional roles in particular could be attributed to the historical context, as democracy finally arrived and women's movements had been strengthened by the 1990s (Sohn, 1994; Lee and Chin, 2007).

Another gender difference between two countries comes from item 5 (Parents should have own life). While no significant male-female differences found in Japan, Korean women do differ in this item from their male counterparts. Somewhat more surprisingly, Korean women compared to Japanese sisters show higher scores on this: The mean value for Korean women is 5.77 and for Japanese

women 4.95. Apparently, as a sub-group, Korean women tend to think most that parents should have own life and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children. This finding reveals the reality of Korean women. Korean women still play a pivotal role in family support structure and often overburdened with obligations and expectations, with the biggest burden being childcare. Thus, this finding has important implications for how women approach the family. Meanwhile, this value preference may also give rise to a sense of self-determination that shapes how women think on family issues.

Table 2 reports the results of psychological involvement. The literature observes frequently that women who are taught that politics is a man's concern show less interest in and talk little about politics. A belief that politics is an inappropriate concern for women strongly constrains women's political activity (Christy, 1987). In this sense, a high level of psychological involvement is a prelude to active participation. While women of both nations, as illustrated in Table 2, are less likely to have interest in politics and to discuss political matters less frequently with their friends than men, Korean women show the least in their PI in politics.

<Table 2>
Level of Psychological Involvement: The Gender Gap

Korea										
	Interest in Politics			Tot%	N	Discuss Politics ^a			Tot%	N
	Low	Med	High			Low	Med	High		
Female	60.6	35.9	3.5	100.0	596	32.6	62.4	5.0	100.0	596
Male	39.9	47.7	12.4	100.0	604	18.5	66.9	14.6	100.0	604
Statistical Association (TAUc)	.22						20			
Gender Gap	20.7	-11.8	-8.9			14.1	-4.5	-9.6		

Japan										
	Interest in Politics			Tot%	N	Discuss Politics ^a			Tot%	N
	Low	Med	High			Low	Med	High		
Female	43.5	46.5	10.0	100.0	709	42.9	50.9	6.2	100.0	704
Male	28.4	49.0	22.5	100.0	630	27.2	64.1	8.7	100.0	621
Statistical Association (TAUc)	.20						.16			
Gender Gap	15.1	-2.5	-12.5			5.7	-13.2	-2.5		

^a The high, medium, low response categories for political interest and discussion are respectively: very; somewhat; not very; not at all and frequently; occasionally; never. We combined two response categories for the low response category for political interest for a simple presentation: not very and not at all interest.

Note: Due to either the exclusion of "don't know" and "no response" categories from the table or rounding off the fractions, the total percentage is not equal to 100.

As for the political interest item, 3.5 percent of the Korean female respondents exhibit high interest compared to 12.4 percent of the male counterparts, with a gap by 8.9 points in favor of men; 10 to 23 for the Japanese case, with a 12.5 point gap in favor of men. We notice an even more dramatic gender gap in the political discussion item in Korea. Again, we observe that the proportion of women in the highest level category is considerably lower than that for the male counterpart in Korea, whereas Japanese women are slightly less voluble about politics than are their male counterparts. It is striking to note that signs of long-term cultural influence in these two East Asian nations persist in political attitudes.

Meanwhile, we might also expect that this gender gap in politicization would be gradually fading, however. One major factor that tends to erase the gender gap is formal education. It is a well-established proposition that education is an important factor affecting one's attitudes toward society and politics not only because it indicates one's social position but also because it increases "the likelihood of gaining specific knowledge about civil liberties and the democratic process" (Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978, p. 61). In fact, a strong and positive relationship between education and

modern attitudes has been found in a variety of political attitude studies.

Sapiro (1983, p. 153) and Klein (1984, pp110-111) both document importance of education to political development of women, especially when it is coupled with a lessening of traditional gender role restrictions. Moreover, Baxter and Lansing (1983, p. 57) show that, relative to young men, college education makes young women more politically liberal and as or more politically active. Tolleson Rinehart (1988) proved this from the study of University of South Carolina students. Here we hypothesize that greater interest in or more frequent discussion about politics is more likely to be found among the better educated women: The more highly educated woman is, the more likely she is to have an active interest in and to discuss politics. Moreover, we would also expect to find that the highly educated women are likely to show the same, if not more, amount of political discussion or interest as the male counterparts.

As we see in Table 3, education fails to enhance the psychological resources of women in both places. This means that the gender gap is not eliminated. It also means, however, that educated women are not conversive with

⁵⁰ It is noteworthy to mention that demonstrations in Korea have almost always been anti-regime while in Japan they tend to be for more limited goals. Even a change in government, in Japan, has not meant a change in regime, as it has in Korea.

politics than are less educated people of either sex, which is more apparent in the Japanese case than in the Korean counterpart. Thus, in both countries unlike the case in the twenty Western industrial societies (Inglehart, 1990, p. 349), women's politicization does yet appear to occur in a wave upon which educated women find the crest.

<Table 3>
Psychological Involvement by Educational Level and Gender

Education	Psychological Involvement	Women		Men		Gender Gap		Statistical	
		Korea	Japan	Korea	Japan	(% Women - % Men)		Association(TAUc)	
						Korea	Japan	Korea	Japan
Primary	Interest	30	55	87	78	-57	-23	.53	.26
	Discussion	45	57	88	70	-43	-13	.42	.14
Secondary	Interest	42	55	60	71	-18	-16	.20	.19
	Discussion	69	57	81	72	-12	-15	.19	.15
College	Interest	38	62	59	71	-21	-9	.19	.11
	Discussion	70	60	81	76	-11	-16	.16	.11

Note: Entries are the combined percentage of "very" and "somewhat" for Interest in Politics; discuss "frequently" and "occasionally" for Discuss Politics.

Table 4 demonstrates the response distributions for the other two politically relevant variables —protest potential and political cynicism. Overall, the results again fail to show the inter-sex gap in each nation (also shown in Table 5). Yet, we detect some cross-national differences. With respect to the protest potential scale, at first glance, it suggests that only values greater than 2.0

represent a strong disposition towards protest action. It should be noted that support for protest remains a minority opinion regardless of sex. Still it is interesting to note that while the men's score, as expected, is higher than the women's in each country, Korean women show a considerable propensity to express willingness to participate in protest action than either sex of Japanese counterparts. This finding does not surprise us. Historically, Korean women, compared to Japanese

counterparts, have more reservoir of protest because of their greater exposure to and experience with more politicized milieu from authoritarianism in the 1980s.⁵⁰ As for the political cynicism item, Korean women are marginally more trustful (less cynical) of government institutions than are Japanese counterparts, but the differences are tiny.

<Table 4>

Distribution of Protest Potential and Political Cynicism by Sex

Protest Potential				
	Korea		Japan	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
1	30.4	25.0	39.9	37.3
2	53.2	52.1	52.2	51.3
3	16.4	22.9	6.9	11.3
Total %	100	100	99	99.9
Mean	1.92	1.99	1.74	1.82

Protest Potential				
	Korea		Japan	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
1	2.3	2.7	2.5	2.3
2	37.8	29.4	28.6	32.9
3	46.2	50.8	51.9	47.3
4	13.7	17.1	17.1	17.5
Total %	100	100	100.1	100
Mean	2.72	2.78	2.78	2.74

Note: Ranges of scores: from 1 = 'would never do' to 3 = 'have done' (midpoint 2.0) for Protest Potential; from 1 = 'not at all trust' to 4 = 'great deal trust' (midpoint 2.5) for Political Cynicism.

If we control for age, representing generational effects, and education, representing not only greater exposure to participatory norms but norms more supportive of egalitarianism and personal efficacy, will gender differences fade? Table 5 reports the results of regression analysis. The gender gap is not apparent except for the PI variable. Controlling for age alone does little to alter a basic gender gap in politicization in Korea, nor does it affect the smaller gap between men

and women in their orientations in Japan. Education alone is also of limited help. So the sex effects on psychological involvement are virtually unaffected when controlling for effects of either education or age or both in both places: Women are less likely to exhibit higher levels of political interest and discussion than their male counterparts. As uncovered in the forgoing analysis, the modern values, political cynicism, and protest potential are little to do with sex, with one significant exception from Korea. While the gender gap in political cynicism turned out to be insignificant in Korea, it became significant once age, or age and education together were factored in, suggesting support for political institutions became more salient especially among old women.

<Table 5>

The Association Between Political Engagement and Sex, Controlling for Education and Age^a

Korea	Controlling for:			
		Education	Age	Education & Age
Modern Values	.33	.26	.16	.15
Psychological				
Involvement	-.13	-.16	-.03	(-.04)
Political Cynicism	.20	.15	(.07)	(.07)
Protest Potential	(.08)	(.02)	(-.10)	(-.08)

^a Marital Status is a dummy, with "single" = 1

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) for marital status. Marital status was regressed alone on the dependent variables, then with education, age, and education and age. Correlations not significant at $p < .01$ are shown in parentheses.

Japan	Controlling for:			
		Education	Age	Education & Age
Modern Values	.19	.17	(.05)	(.04)
Psychological				
Involvement	-.19	-.19	(.07)	(.07)
Political Cynicism	.13	.11	(-.04)	(-.04)
Protest Potential	-.18	-.20	-.12	-.13

Feminist literature, however, suggests that although in general women do not differ from men in fundamental values, subgroups of women (e.g., feminists and nonfeminists) may differ from men in ways that would shed light on the argument (Conover, 1988; Wilcox, 1991; Carnaghan and Bahry, 1990). Feminist theorists further argue that a feminist identity influences women's values and policy preferences. This identity proves to be strongly related to political values, to basic orientation, and ultimately to issue preferences. Though not directly dealing with the validity of this feminist explanation, we are able to test indirectly subgroups of women —married vs. single.

While the impact of marriage and family on political participation is no longer significant for American males and females (Welch, 1977), marriage and family for many Asian women are restricting in ways that are not restricting to men (Darcy and Song, 1986; Carlberg, 1976, p. 239; Lebra, 1984). Becoming a housewife, therefore, in these two East Asian nations is some kind of resocialization process, thus expecting roles traditionally performed by women as wives and mothers. In fact, the way of life and use of time of wives and singles differ so drastically that it would not be an exaggeration to say that they belong to different time zones and spaces.

Lebra (1984, p. 300), for instance, overly describes this sharp distinction of sex roles in

the Japanese case by saying that "once married, role division could so sharpen that husband and wife would have nothing in common." Here we might speculate that there may be significant intra-sex differences of orientations towards political matters: Non-housewives are more probably unmarried, relatively young with high education, and quite different attitudes and behaviors toward society as well as politics (Tolleson Rinehart, 1992, pp. 98-106). If our hypothesis is correct, we should then expect to find a gap on those political engagement variables between housewives and non-housewives.

<Table 6>
The Association Between Political Engagement and Marital Status (Women Only)^a

Korea	Controlling for:			
		Education	Age	Education & Age
Modern Values	(.05)	(.07)	(-.01)	(.02)
Psychological				
Involvement	-.20	-.19	-.17	-.16
Political Cynicism	(-.08)	(-.06)	-.12	-.10
Protest Potential	(-.03)	(-.01)	(-.06)	(-.04)

Japan	Controlling for:			
		Education	Age	Education & Age
Modern Values	(-.03)	(.00)	(-.05)	(-.02)
Psychological				
Involvement	-.14	-.14	-.12	-.10
Political Cynicism	(.01)	(.03)	(.00)	(.01)
Protest Potential	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.04)

^a Sex is dummied, with female = 1.
Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) for sex. Sex was regressed alone on the dependent variables, then with education, age, and education and age. Coefficients not significant at p<.01 are shown in parentheses.

We replicated the same regression analysis to the intra-sexual case and examined

⁵¹ The distribution of respondents' marital status is: in the Korean sample, married (68.6%), living as married (.6%), divorced (1.2%), separated (.5%), widowed (2.2%), and single (26.9%); in the Japanese sample, married (72.1%), living as married (1.2%), divorced (2.9%), separated (.8%), widowed (4.0%), and single (17.6%). We recoded 'married', 'living as married', 'divorced', 'separated', and 'widowed' as 0 and 'single' as 1.

differences between married and single women.⁵¹ Table 6 shows vividly that single women have remarkable edge on their married counterparts in every orientation in Japan and all but protest potential in Korea: Single women show more modern values, lower PI in politics, more distrust in government institutions, and less prone to protest in the case of Japan. Yet controlling for education and age drastically reduces married women's disadvantage to insignificance in both PI and political cynicism, and modern values in the case of Japan, suggesting that more women are struggling to change the Confucian association of gender and political marginalization from within and without the family.

Perhaps most significant and interesting, we observe in the Korean case that the effects of marital status on values still remain significant even when the effects of either education or age or both are controlled for, suggesting that single women, regardless of age and education, are more likely to possess modern values than ones being married. This finding empirically attests that Confucianism has a stronger hold in Korea than in Japan — more strict Confucian moral codes to married Korean women.

In the Japanese case, intra-sex differences in traditional values, PI in politics, and political cynicism are diminished more by holding age constant than by controlling for education, suggesting inter-generational replacement does matter in inducing greater openness towards non-traditional views and in lessening an absolute deference to political authority. One

exception stands out from a substantial negative relationship with protest activity: Single women tend to exhibit a lower potential to involve themselves in protest activities even after age and/or education are taken into account. This does not surprise us given the fact that protest was most active in Japan in the 1950s and 1960. In addition, this finding suggests that an existing literature on elite-challenging activities turns out to be invalid at least in the Japanese case: Protest is not the domain of the young.

6. Conclusion

Not all the variables examined in the investigation of the gender gap in political orientation support those two socialization and situational explanations. On balance, however, the findings of this study support the contention that those two hypotheses are of merit. Our data confirm that gender shapes the way people view political world. Further, our data show not only that women differ from men, but also that women differ from each other. On the other hand, we are reluctant to agree on common explanations for women's lesser rates of participation in politics in East Asia at least at attitudinal level. In fact, we have learned from both cases that "women, says Tolleson Rinehart, are not an undifferentiated and largely apolitical mass but (...) could be political creatures responding to (...) their environments within the particular constraints of their immediate contexts" (1992, p. 13).

Specifically, we have examined values and

three political engagement variables to investigate if significant differences exist between men and women and among women in their attitudes toward social values and politics in two Asian nations. We have learned from the analysis that sex alone is nothing to do with values, system trust, and protest action: Neither do men and women differ on values and trust in government institutions, nor do they differ on willingness to protest. Sex does effect on psychological involvement which have not significantly reduced even when education and age were controlled.

Although we did not directly deal with the validity of the socialization explanation, by showing that males and females are different in their political orientations, particularly towards the PI variable, as adults, it is safe to conclude that the socialization explanation does become still relevant in these two Asian nations. Certainly for Korean women the combined experience of political socialization and gender-role socialization results in an adult woman who is far less responsive to political cues than are men. The situational variable of marital status does have an impact on political orientations, particularly on political orientations of the less educated and the old. Thus we found that single women had remarkable advantage over their married counterparts in political orientations. Education and age helped to reduce these intra-sex differences particularly in Japan.

While Korean and Japanese women have been treated as the historical outsiders in a traditionally male-dominated society, the traditional values have also been tested by the economic and demographic changes of the past 40 years. Although less represented in the political arena, a small segment of Asian women has recently become quite active in

domains such as social welfare, the environment, and war and peace, attributing to a rapid expansion of women's issue-oriented groups, service organizations, consumer groups, and church-based groups (Palley, 1990; Web Japan, 2008). All of these organizations have worked to foster changes in the status of women. For instance, Korean women have given special concern for community related activities like schools, parks, health facilities, further hoping to establish themselves in the newly organized autonomous local governments (SCW, 2000).

Women in Japan too have been active especially in consumer and environmental movements. Local groups have been organized by local housewives, primarily focusing on social welfare policies and the family. Moreover, Japanese women, compared to Korean sisters, have become active in contemporary politics. 33 women (13.6%) were elected to the Upper House in 2004, which shows the intensified political consciousness of some Japanese women (Web Japan, 2008).

Given all these changes, this study concludes that only when women's parochial participation are meaningfully combined with a high level of political consciousness, the rise of women's interest groups on a number of fronts from advocates of change to the Family Law in Korea and the Plan for Gender-Equality in Japan, to representatives of women farm workers, to middle class women's employment activists, do these Asian women successfully arrive at the erosion of the status of the second class citizen.

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